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Abstract 
This study uses changes in pension laws for Union Army veterans as a natural experiment 
to estimate the causal effect of pensions on longevity, and to examine potential pathways 
underlying such a relationship.  We examine the effects of the pension laws of 1907 and 
1912, which granted old-age pensions to Union Army veterans. Life expectancy for 
veterans, who received such a pension, increased by 0.5 years and 2.7 years, respectively. 
The effect of veteran pensions on longevity was large across wealth groups and size of 
city. Pensions reduced mortality for both acute and non-acute causes of death.  
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1. Introduction 
Individuals with higher incomes tend to live longer (see surveys by Goldman 
2001, Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-Muney 2006). This relationship is well documented not 
only for individuals with different incomes in the same country (Rogot, Sorlie, 
Johannson, and Schmitt 1992, Gaudecker and Scholz 2006), but it is also evident for 
average life expectancy across countries (Pritchett and Summers 1996) and across 
different time periods (Fogel 2004). However, the relationship between income and 
longevity is complex and multi-facetted. Not only is it possible that higher income 
extends life, but it is also possible that better health increases income (Smith 1999, 
Stewart 2001).  
This study uses the passing of pension laws for Union Army veterans in the early 
20th century as a natural experiment to examine the causal effect of pensions on 
longevity. Veteran pensions constituted the first large-scale old-age pension system in the 
United States. For some periods, pensions for Union Army veterans amounted to more 
than 40% of federal expenditures and covered more than 900,000 beneficiaries (Sanders 
2000). We use longitudinal data from military and pension records which were collected 
from records housed in the national archives (ICSPR Series 6837), and information from 
the U.S. Federal Census in 1900 (ICSPR Series 6836). We examine the effects of the 
pension laws of 1907 and 1912, which granted pensions to all Union Army veterans, who 
had served in the army for a minimum of 90 days and were age 62+. The effect of 
pensions on longevity are examined separately by wealth levels, and for urban vs. rural 
populations, and we also investigate the effect of pensions on different causes of death. 
This approach allows us to explore not only the direction of causality for a possible effect 
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from income to longevity, but also to examine the size of the effect, and learn more about 
the relevance and relative importance of different pathways in the health-income 
relationship.  
Several potential pathways for a causal effect from income to health have been 
debated in the previous literature. McKeown (1976) and Fogel (2004) argue that much of 
the increase in life expectancy during the past two centuries is caused by improved 
nutrition. Pensions might have enabled Union Army veterans to buy more and higher 
quality food, which made them more resistant against infectious diseases. 
Malnourishment is a rare problem in developed countries today, but poor nutrition is still 
a concern in many developing countries (Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006). 
Another explanation for health differentials focuses on the psychosocial stress, which 
comes from low socioeconimic status and lack of control over one’s life (Brunner and 
Marmot 1999). Such stress may cause biological reactions that increase the risk of 
chronic diseases, especially cardiovascular diseases. This theory is supported by evidence 
from British Civil Servants, for whom there is a strong association between health and 
rank in the British Civil Service (Marmot et al. 1991), and from other primates such as 
baboons, for whom there exists a relationship between low rank in the baboon hierarchy 
and increased risk of cardiovascular disease (Sapolsky 1993, 1998). A third possible 
explanations for a causal effect from pensions on longevity focuses on health behaviors. 
Philipson and Becker (1998) argue that annuities such as lifelong veteran pensions 
provide incentives for beneficiaries to invest in their health and live longer. A fourth 
possible explanation for a causal effect of pensions on longevity centers on labor supply. 
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Beneficiaries of a pension can afford to work less, which might improve their health 
(Ruhm 2000). 
An important question, which has not been conclusively answered in the previous 
literature, is how redistributive government policies such as disability pensions or old-age 
pensions affect the health and longevity of beneficiaries. Previous studies on the effect of 
pensions on mortality arrive at opposite conclusions. Snyder and Evans (2006) use the 
Social Security notch in the 1970s as a source of exogenous income variation, and they 
find that lower pensions actually decrease mortality. Given the positive correlation 
between health and income, this finding is somewhat surprising. In contrast, in a study 
based on Union Army veterans, Logue and Blanck (2004) find that mortality rates were 
lower for veterans who received higher pensions. However, their estimation is based on 
time-invariant variables for the average pension amount, which each veteran received in 
the period between 1874 and 1890, and in the period between 1891 and 1907. Since 
pensions became more generous over time, average pensions are likely to be higher for 
veterans who survived longer. Also, during their study period the amount of pension 
depended on the degree of disability and was therefore not exogenous to health and 
mortality. To circumvent such endogeneity issues, our study examines the effect of old-
age pensions, which did not depend on health. 
Using Weibull hazard regression models, we find a large causal effect from 
veteran pensions on longevity. Life expectancy increases by about 0.5 years and 2.7 years 
for veterans who receive a law of 1907 pension and a law of 1912 pension, respectively. 
We find evidence for large causal effects across wealth groups and for both urban and 
rural populations, but the effects are largest for poorer veterans and veterans who live 
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outside big cities. Pensions also reduce mortality from both acute and non-acute causes. 
This study continues as follows. Section 2 describes the Union Army pension laws. 
Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 specifies the empirical model. Hazard regression 
results are presented in section 5. Results for the effect of pensions on life expectancy are 
explained in section 6. Section 7 shows estimation result for the effect of pensions on 
various causes of death, and section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Union Army pension laws 
The Union army pension program started with the General Law of July 14, 1862, 
which granted pensions to volunteer soldiers with war-related disabilities. The size of the 
pension depended on the severity of the disability. Subsequently, both the amount of 
pensions and the number of eligible veterans were increased in several stages (see 
overview in Table 1).1 The Disability Act of June 27, 1890 introduced a new pension 
rating system that co-existed with provisions of the General Law. The Disability Act 
granted pensions to disabled Union Army veterans who had served for a minimum of 90 
days and were unable to earn support by manual labor. Monthly pensions ranged from $6 
to $12, depending on the degree of disability. Disability Act pensions were typically 
smaller than General Law pensions, which ranged to $125 monthly, but eligibility 
requirements were much less stringent, since disabilities no longer needed to be war-
related.  
The Union Army pension scheme was further expanded on February 6, 1907, 
when pensions were granted to all veterans age 62+ who had served for a minimum of 90 
                                                 
1
 Detailed descriptions of the Union army pension schemes are presented by Sanders (2000), Linares 
(2001), and Campbell (2004). 
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days. The monthly pension depended on age and was $12 for veterans aged 62 – 69, $15 
for veterans aged 70 – 74, and $20 for veterans aged 75+. The law of May 11, 1912, 
further increased pensions, based on a rating system that depended both on age and the 
length of service. Monthly pensions now ranged from $13.50 to $30. In our analysis 
sample, mean monthly pensions based on the 1907 and 1912 laws were $14.50 and 
$20.92, respectively.  
These pensions were generous by the standards of their time when mean monthly 
earnings for non-farm employees were $40.25 in 1900 (Lebergott 1984). Public 
expenditures on Union army pensions constituted substantial shares of the federal budget 
in the late 1800s and early 1900s--41% in 1893 and 24% in 1909 (Sanders 2000).  One 
explanation for these large allocations on behalf of Union Army veterans was the 
political power of the Great Army of the Republic, a veterans´ organization, which 
yielded an influence that was disproportionate to the number of Union Army veterans in 
the population (Holcombe 1999, Linares 2001).  Veterans of the Confederate Army were 
ineligible for federal pensions.  
This study examines how enactment of the laws of 1907 and 1912 affected 
mortality rates for veterans who received pensions based on these laws. We focus on the 
impact of these later pension laws, because they did not link pensions to disability, and 
veterans who qualified for pensions under these laws were therefore not selected on 
health. Many of the law of 1907 pensioners already received a disability act pension 
before 19072. However, after 1907 most disability act pensioners switched to the law of 
1907 pension system, which had less restrictive eligibility requirements and provided 
                                                 
2
 Disability Act pensions were awarded generously. In 1904, President Roosevelt issued an executive order 
to grant pensions to all veterans age 62+, unless they were unusually vigorous (Costa 1998, p. 201). 
However, this was still a selection on health, which ended only after the law of 1907 was passed.  
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higher pensions. The size of the increase for the individual veteran depended on the 
veteran’s age and previous pension. The law of 1912 also substantially increased 
pensions. The magnitude of the increase for the individual veteran depended on his age, 
and length of military service. 
 
3. Data  
We use longitudinal data on Union Army recruits, which are based on two sources 
of information. The first source is a dataset on Military, Pensions, and Medical Records 
(ICSPR Series 6837), assembled from military-related documents housed in the National 
Archives in Washington, DC, and which also includes applications made by veterans for 
pension support. The second source comes from U.S. Census Records in 1900 for all 
veterans who could be linked to Census documents (ICSPR Series 6836). Our analysis 
focuses on the period 1900-17. This period contains the passing of the laws of 1907 and 
1912. Our observational period starts in 1900 because of the availability of matched 
Census data for this year, and ends in 1917, just before the outbreak of the flu pandemic 
of 1918.  
Our sample includes recruits from 303 companies randomly selected among white 
volunteer infantry regiments by the University of Chicago, Center for Population 
Economics, the organization which assembled the data. This sample includes 22,051 
veterans with non-missing information on dates of birth and death. Information on birth 
dates were collected from military, pension, and Census records. Information on death 
dates were assembled from pension files. Eighty-five percent of soldiers who survived 
the war have a pension file, because either the veteran or his dependents applied for a 
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pension (Costa 1998). Of the veterans without pension files, many were ineligible for a 
pension, i.e. because of desertion, or they died before 1890, when the veteran pension 
system was still very restrictive (Fogel 1993). We restrict our sample to 7,931 veterans 
who were alive at the beginning of 1900, and who did not receive a General Law pension 
for war-related disabilities. General Law pensions were typically higher than pensions 
under the laws of 1907 and 1912, so that most General Law pensioners had no incentive 
to apply for law of 1907 pensions or law of 1912 pensions. Our sample consists of 
veterans, who at the start of our study period in 1900 either received no pension or a 
disability act pension. 
The data include detailed information on veterans’ pension applications and the 
pension board’s rulings. This includes information on the law that the application was 
based on, whether the pension board approved or rejected an application, and the date 
from which pension payment started. We create two binary time-varying variables, which 
are set to one if a veteran received a pension at the end of the year based on the law of 
1907 or 1912, respectively. For example, for a typical veteran who received a disability 
act pension from 1900 to 1906, a law of 1907 pension from 1907 to 1911, and a law of 
1912 pension from 1912 to 1917, the law of 1907 pension variable is set to zero for the 
period from 1900 to 1906; it is set to one for the period from 1907 to 1911, and the 
variable takes on the value zero again for the period from 1912 to 1917. Correspondingly, 
the variable for receiving a law of 1912 pension is zero for the period from 1900 to 1911, 
and it is one for the period from 1912 to 1917. In 1907, some veterans already received a 
Disability Act pension of $12 monthly, and had no incentive to apply for an equivalent 
$12 monthly act of 1907 pension. Starting from 1907, these veterans are counted among 
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those who receive a law of 1907 pension. The take up rate was 90.9% for the law of 1907 
and 91.5% for the law of 1912 (Table 2). Take up rates are defined as the share of 
veterans in the sample who survive beyond 1907 or 1912, respectively, and who at some 
point of time receive a pension based on the relevant law. One potential concern is that 
take-up could be related to veterans’ health.  It is possible that some veterans were too 
sick to undertake the hassle of applying for a pension. But it is also possible that our 
reported take up rates are too low, because some pension records were lost or misplaced, 
or because some veterans in our sample were in fact not eligible for a pension, i.e. 
because they served for less than 90 days3. As a plausibility test, in analysis not shown 
we regressed a binary take-up variable on the observed characteristics listed in table 3. 
For the law of 1907, pension take-up was more likely for veterans who were farmers or 
service workers, and less likely for veterans who lived in cities with a population > 
250,000. For the law of 1912, all explanatory variables were jointly insignificant in 
explaining pension take up. 5.8% of veterans, who survived beyond 1907, were rejected 
with at least one application for a law of 1907 pension (Table 2). The equivalent rejection 
rate for law of 1912 pensions was 3.4%. However, most applicants finally received a 
pension. Only 0.6% of veterans, who survived beyond 1907, applied for a law of 1907 
pension at least once and never received such a pension. For law of 1912 pensions, the 
equivalent share was 0.4%. 
We also control for individual veteran attributes that plausibly affect longevity, 
specified as a set of time-invariant binary variables based on 1900 Census data: literacy 
                                                 
3
 Our dataset includes a variable for pensionable length of service. We exclude four veterans from the 
sample, for whom we know that pensionable length of service was less than 90 days. However, this 
information is missing for 64.1% of the sample. Veterans with missing information on pensionable length 
of service were included in the sample.  
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(literate versus illiterate); marital status (married versus not married), occupation 
(classification following Wilcox (1992), with professional or proprietor as omitted 
category), home ownership (homeowner versus renter), and city size (using most 158 
populated cities in 1909—top 19 (>250,000 population), next 139 cities (26,235-250,000 
population), omitted category (population <26,235) (U. S. Census Bureau 1909). We use 
literacy as an approximation of education and homeownership as an approximation of 
wealth. Census records were linked to veterans’ pension files based on name and place of 
residence (Fogel 1993). However, pension records were not available or not complete for 
all veterans. The share of missing observations ranged from 19.5% for marital status to 
65.8% for place of residence. In order to account for missing observations, we create 
binary variables for missing information on literacy, marital status, occupation, 
homeownership, and population of place of residence. 
The mean age in 1900 in our baseline estimation sample was 60.7 years (Table 3). The 
mean age at death was 75.9 years. Of those veterans with non-missing observations, 93.8% 
were literate and 81.7% were married. Most common occupation groups were farmers 
(34.9%), and artisans (15.1%). 67.6% were homeowners, 14% lived in cities with more than 
250,000 populations and an additional 10.5% lived in the next 139 most populated cities.   
 
4. Empirical Specification  
We estimate a mortality hazard model, assuming a Weibull distribution and allowing 
for unobserved heterogeneity.4 The mortality hazard is the risk of dying during the next 
period conditional on surviving until the end of the previous period. This represents for 
                                                 
4
 Lancaster (1990) provides an excellent review of the estimation of duration models.  
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example the risk of a 65 year old veteran of dying during the next year. The mortality hazard 
function for individual i at time t is: 
λ(t) = λ0(t)*exp(law1907it β +  law1912it γ + X′i θ)*ηi,     
where λ0(t) = α* tα-1 is the baseline hazard for the Weibull distribution with the 
shape parameter α, and exp(law1907it β + law1912it γ + X′i θ) is the proportional hazard 
with parameters β, γ, and θ. law1907
 it   and law1912 it  are time-varying binary variables 
which take on the value of one, if individual i at the end of period t receives a pension 
based on the law of 1907 or the law of 1912, respectively. For periods, in which veterans 
receive a law of 1907 pension, the corresponding pension variable is set to one, and for 
periods, in which veterans do not receive a law of 1907 pension, this variable is set to 
zero. Xi is a vector of individual-specific time-invariant covariates which control for 
individuals’ initial literacy, marital status, occupation, wealth, and place of residence. 
This information does not vary over time, because it is not continuously observed. We 
account for individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity by including a multiplicative 
term ηi (>0), distributed as gamma with mean 1 and variance σ (see e.g., Lancaster 
1979).5 Time (t) represents the age of veterans. Time is left-censored. Veterans enter the 
observation period, which starts in 1900, at different ages. Age is accounted for through 
the shape of the baseline hazard function. There are no additional explanatory variables 
for age. Our observational period ends in 1917. Observations of Veterans who survived 
beyond 1917 are treated as right-censored.  
                                                 
5
 Three assumptions required to account for unobserved heterogeneity are: (1) the heterogeneity term is 
independent of the covariates; (2) the heterogeneity term has a distribution known up to some parameters; 
and (3) the heterogeneity term enters the hazard function multiplicatively. The mean also needs to be 
normalized to one for identification.  
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The estimation compares mortality hazards for veterans who receive a law of 
1907 or a law of 1912 pension with mortality hazards for veterans who receive no such 
pensions. This comparison group includes observations for the time before the law of 
1907 was passed as well as veterans who did not yet reach the pension age of 62 or did 
not take up a pension. The identification is based mostly on the comparison of mortality 
hazard rates for different time periods. Our identification strategy is illustrated in Figure 
1. The drawn out line represents mortality risk at age 65 for Union Army veterans in our 
sample during the 1900-17 period. Before 1907, veterans received either no pension or a 
disability act pension. From 1907 to 1911, most 65 year old veterans received a law of 
1907 pension, and from 1912 to 1917 most 65 year old veterans received a law of 1912 
pension. The reduction in mortality after 1907, which is represented by arrow a in Figure 
1, is attributed to law of 1907 pensions, and the further decrease in mortality risk after 
1912, which is illustrated by arrow b, is attributed to law of 1912 pensions. One concern 
is that lower mortality in later years could be explained not by the effect of a pension, but 
by a time trend of increasing longevity. During our study period, there was no time trend 
in life expectancy at age 65 for males in the U.S. population overall (Table 4). Although 
male life expectancy at birth increased rapidly from 46.61 years in 1900 to 52.18 years in 
1917, life expectancy at age 65 remained roughly constant; life expectancy for the total 
male U.S. population at age 65 was 11.35 years in 1900, 11.01 years in 1907, 11.49 years 
in 1912, and 11.22 years in 1917 (Bell and Miller 2005). During our study period there 
was also no time trend in life expectancy at age 65 for white males in northern states and 
for native-born white males in northern states6. In 1870, 52% of 25-29 year old men were 
                                                 
6
 Census records indicate that life expectancy in northern states at age 65 was 11.95 years in 1901 and 
11.67 years in 1910 for white males, and 11.51 years in 1901 and 11.25 years for native-born white males 
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Civil War veterans (Campbell 2004)7, and the Union Army veterans in our dataset are 
broadly representative for the general northern white population in terms of wealth before 
the war, and in terms of mortality around 1900 (Costa 1998, 2003). By eliminating 
General Law pensioners who received pensions because of war related disabilities, which 
were not common in the general population, our sample should arguably be even more 
representative of the overall white northern U.S. population. Therefore, any substantial 
reduction in mortality for veterans who received a law of 1907 or a law of 1912 pension 
can not be attributed to a time trend of rising longevity.  
We compute estimates of the effect of pensions on life expectancy at age 65. 
Using results from our hazard estimation we compute predicted annual mortality rates for 
every veteran in our sample and for each year of age from age 65 to 99 under the 
counterfactual assumption that the pension laws of 1907 and 1912 were never enacted. 
We use these mortality rates to predict the life expectancy at age 65 for every veteran in 
the sample. Next, we compute an alternative set of predicted mortality rates under the 
equally counterfactual assumption that all veterans always received a law of 1907 
pension. Based on the alternative mortality rates we predict life expectancy at age 65 for 
every veteran in the sample. The mean effect of a law of 1907 pension on life expectancy 
at age 65 is calculated as the difference between mean life expectancy with and without 
the 1907 pension law. We use a similar method to estimate the effect of law of 1912 
pensions on the life expectancy of veterans at age 65.   
                                                                                                                                                 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/lifetables/life1890-1910.pdf, accessed Feb 8, 2007). For 1919-1920, for 
white males in northern states only life expectancy at ages 62 and 67 is reported in Census records. For this 
group, in 1919-1920 life expectancy at age 67 was 10.56 years as opposed to 10.25 years in 1909-11 
(http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/lifetables/life19-20.pdf, accessed Feb. 8, 2007).  
7
 Since veterans comprised a significant share of the elderly male population, the effects of veteran 
pensions on life expectancy might show in population life expectancy. This could mean that in the absence 
of veteran pensions population life expectancy at age 65 might have declined. 
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5. Hazard regression results 
Hazard regression results are shown in Table 5. Column 1 shows the baseline 
specification, which includes the full estimation sample. Coefficients show hazard ratios. 
A hazard ratio of one indicates that a variable has no effect on mortality. A hazard ratio 
of less than one indicates that a variable is associated with lower mortality. Estimated 
hazard ratios are 0.918 for veterans receiving a law of 1907 pension and 0.665 for 
veterans receiving a law of 1912 pension. These hazard ratios are significantly lower than 
one at the five percent level and one percent level, respectively. These findings indicate 
that there is a causal effect from receiving a pension to lower mortality. We find no 
significant effects of literacy, marital status, and occupation on mortality hazards. 
Mortality hazards for homeowners are significantly lower than for renters (hazard ratio = 
0.816), and mortality for veterans who lived in cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants 
is significantly higher than mortality for veterans in small towns or country (hazard ratio 
= 1.227). Baseline mortality increases with age, as is indicated by the shape parameter of 
8.22. In this specification as well as in all other specifications presented in this study, we 
find no evidence for unobserved heterogeneity; the estimated variance of the gamma 
distributed unobserved heterogeneity term is not significantly different from zero. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 show estimates of the effect of pensions on mortality 
separately for the subgroup of homeowners and renters. We interpret homeownership as 
an approximation of wealth, assuming that homeowners were on average wealthier than 
renters. The size of the causal effect of income on health might well vary with different 
levels of wealth. For example, poor veterans might have been able to afford sufficient 
food only after receiving pensions, while their wealthier counterparts were already well 
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fed even before receiving a pension. If the marginal effect of income on longevity 
declines at higher wealth levels, then pensions should reduce mortality more for renters 
than for homeowners. This hypothesis is confirmed by our estimation results. The 
estimation results in column 2 show the same estimation specification as in column 1, but 
for the subsample of homeowners only. Column 3 shows estimation results for the 
subsample of renters. Hazard ratios for the two pension variables are lower for renters 
than for homeowners. For law of 1907 pensions, hazard ratios are 0.799 for renters and 
0.995 for homeowners. The effect is statistically significant for renters, but not for 
homeowners. For law of 1912 pensions, hazard ratios are 0.610 for renters and 0.715 for 
homeowners. The effect is statistically significant for both groups. Homeowners for 
whom data on occupation are missing have lower mortality rates. All other coefficient 
estimates are not significantly different from one. 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 show estimation results for the effect of pensions on 
longevity separately for veterans who lived in the 158 largest cities (with a population > 
26, 235) and veterans living in smaller towns or rural areas. During the early part of the 
20th Century, mortality was higher in large cities than in smaller communities, a pattern 
that was already observed at the time (Glover 1921). Possible explanations are that the 
quality of food was lower in large cities, the effect of unsanitary conditions was larger, 
and spread of disease was easier in bigger, more crowded cities (Costa 2003, Cutler, 
Deaton and Lleras-Muney 2006). The estimation results in column 4 show the same 
estimation specification as in column 1, but for veterans who live in one of the largest 
158 cities only. Column 5 shows estimation results for veterans who live outside the top 
158 cities. The effects of pensions are less important in large cities than in towns or in the 
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countryside. For law of 1907 pensions, hazard ratios were 0.915 in the largest 158 cities, 
and 0.715 in smaller communities. Only the latter effect is statistically significant. For the 
law of 1912 pensions, hazard ratios are 0.716 in large cities and 0.589 in smaller 
communities. Both effects are statistically significant at the one percent level. These 
findings indicate that pensions had a bigger effect outside the biggest cities. One possible 
explanation is that pensions reduced mortality from some risk factors such as under-
nutrition, but not from other risk factors such as poor water quality, and that exposure to 
risk factors, which were not affected by pensions, was larger in big cities. An alternative 
explanation could be that cost of living was higher in big cities so that in real terms 
pensions were smaller. Homeownership is negatively correlated with mortality in both 
regressions, but the negative relationship is stronger in cities.  The hazard ratio for 
homeownership is 0.729 in larger cities and 0.837 in smaller communities. This might 
reflect that homeowners in big cities were on average wealthier than homeowners in 
smaller communities because of higher property prices. Parameter estimates for all other 
variables are not statistically different from one. 
 
6. Life expectancy  
Based on estimated mortality hazards, we calculate life expectancies at age 65, 
using the method described above.8 Table 5 shows mean predicted life expectancies of 
veterans in the sample. Standard errors of mean life expectancies are calculated from 200 
bootstrap repetitions. Mean predicted life expectancy at age 65 for the full sample is 
11.13 years, which is close to the population mean life expectancy for men at age 65 of 
                                                 
8
 In results not shown, we also calculated life expectancies using a non-parametric Kaplan-Meir approach, 
which does not control for covariates other than pensions. We found that results were very similar for the 
law of 1912, but there was no significant effect for the law of 1907.  
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11.35 years in 1900 and 11.01 years in 1907 (see Table 4). With a law of 1907 pension, 
life expectancy increases to 11.68 years, and with a law of 1912 pension life expectancy 
is 13.83 years. Thus, the effect of a law of 1907 pension on life expectancy at age 65 is 
0.53 years, and the effect of a law of 1912 pension on life expectancy at age 65 is 2.70 
years. As discussed above, there was no time trend of increasing life expectancy at older 
ages during our study period, neither for the general population nor for the white northern 
male population, for which our sample is representative. This implies that higher life 
expectancy for veterans who receive a law of 1907 or a law of 1912 pension is 
attributable to pensions, not to time trends. A gain in life expectancy of 2.7 years is a very 
large effect for a policy measure. For comparison, the overall gain in male life-
expectancy at age 65 during the 20th century was 4.56 years (Table 4). Thus, the effects 
of veteran pensions on life expectancy were equivalent to many decades worth of 
economic growth, and medical progress. However, it is not implausible that a change in 
the economic situation of veterans should have such a large impact on life expectancy. 
Van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Portrait (2006) find that being born during favorable 
business cycle conditions during the 19th century in the Netherlands increased life 
expectancy later in life by more than 2 years. Rablen and Oswald (2007) find that 
scientists who won a Nobel Prize during the first half of the 20th century lived about 2 
years longer than their colleagues who had merely been nominated for a Noble prize, but 
never received the prize.  
We also calculate life expectancy for all subgroups in Table 5. For homeowners, 
life expectancy at baseline is 11.98 years as compared to 10.05 years for veterans who 
did not own their home. This implies that wealthier veterans lived longer, as predicted by 
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the health gradient. Life expectancy for veterans living in cities with a population 
>26,235 is 10.07 years, while life expectancy in smaller communities is 10.66 years. This 
is in accordance with previous findings that during our study period life expectancy was 
lower in big cities (Glover 1921, Cutler, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006). The effect of a 
pension on life expectancy is larger for renters than for homeowners.  For renters the 
impact of a pension based on the laws of 1907 and 1912 are 1.44 and 3.26 years, 
respectively. For homeowners, the impact of a law of 1907 pension is 0.03 years and the 
impact of a law of 1912 pensions is 2.20 years. If homeownership is interpreted as an 
approximation of wealth, then the effect of pensions on longevity is stronger for poorer 
veterans, but there is still a large effect for the wealthier group. The impact of pensions 
on longevity is also larger in smaller communities than in large cities. In smaller 
communities, a law of 1907 pension increases life expectancy by 1.62 years, and a law of 
1912 pension increases life expectancy by 3.38 years. The corresponding effects for 
veterans who lived in one of the biggest 158 cities is 0.53 years and 2.05 years.   
 
7. Cause of death 
As discussed in the introduction there are a number of potential pathways which 
could explain a large causal effect from pensions to longevity. Some of the pathways, 
which previous studies have emphasized as explanations for the health-income-gradient, 
such as early childhood conditions (Van den Berg, Lindeboom, and Portrait 2006) and 
education (Cuter, Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006) , do not apply here, because veteran 
pensions start only late in life. But this leaves a number of possible pathways, such as for 
example better nutrition, higher socioeconomic status, and less exposure to dangerous 
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working and living conditions. These pathways are likely to affect health in different 
ways. Our data includes information about the cause of death for veterans in our sample. 
This information can be used to draw inferences about the relevance of potential 
pathways. For example, better nourished people are less likely to succumb to infectious 
diseases. They resist most bacterial (though not viral) diseases better, and recover more 
rapidly and more often (McKeown 1976, Fogel 2004). Outside of economics the 
currently dominant theory is that poor health of low-income people is caused by 
psychosocial stress- the consequences of having low socioeconomic status and little 
control over one’s life. This psychosocial stress causes biochemical reactions that lead to 
increased probabilities of chronic diseases, especially cardiovascular diseases (Brunner 
and Marmot 1999, Sapolsky 1993, 1998). Veteran pensions might have increased the 
social status of veterans in two ways. First, pensions provided higher income. Second, 
they also provided recognition of past patriotic service. Another possible pathway is that 
pensions allowed veterans to retire from work. Snyder and Evans (2006) argue that 
working at older ages actually decreases mortality, but working conditions were more 
dangerous in the past than they are today (Costa and Kahn 2004). Retirement from work 
could lead to a lower probability of fatal accidents, but also to a reduction in chronic 
diseases.  
The data provide information on the cause of death for 47.8% of the veterans in 
the baseline sample in Table 5, Column 1. Veterans for whom cause of death is available 
tended to be those with remaining dependents who could claim widow or orphan 
pensions. Information about cause of death comes mostly from death certificates that 
were sent to the pension office by relatives of deceased veterans. Information about cause 
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of death in our data is very detailed and includes categories such as such as “struck by 
train (accidental)” and “struck by train (suicide)”. Causes of death are grouped into eight 
categories, which follow broad ICD 9-CM code classes (Table 7). For the veterans in our 
sample with known death cause, the shares of causes of death by category are: infectious 
and parasitic diseases (6.9 %), diseases of the respiratory system (9.9%) , diarrhea (0.5 
%), diseases of the circulatory system (29.2 %), cancer and neoplasms (5.5%), diseases of 
the genitourinary system (7.9 %), diseases of the digestive system (4.4%), accidents and 
violence (3.7%), and other (31.5 %)9. The total share of acute diseases is 17.4% 
(infectious and parasitic diseases, diseases of the respiratory system, diarrhea), and the 
share of non-acute diseases is 78.9% (diseases of the circulatory system, cancer and 
neoplasms, diseases of the genitourinary system, diseases of the digestive system, and 
other diseases). The frequency of death causes during our study period was different from 
today (Costa 2003, Cutler, Deaton, and Muney-Lleras 2006). Some of the most common 
causes of death a century ago are rare in developed countries today (e.g. death due to 
some infectious diseases such as tuberculosis or respiratory infections), while other 
causes of death are more common today (e.g., lung cancer). Overall, the share of people 
dying from infectious diseases has declined, while the share of people dying from chronic 
diseases, especially ischemic heart diseases and cancer, has increased (Costa 2003). The 
distribution of death causes in our data is more similar to developing countries than to 
developed countries today. In developing countries infectious diseases such as 
tuberculosis and respiratory infections are still a frequent cause of death (Cutler, Deaton, 
and Lleras-Muney 2006).  
                                                 
9
 Death causes that were grouped as other category include endocrine diseases, diseases of the blood and 
blood forming organs, diseases of the nervous system, diseases of the digestive system, diseases of the skin, 
diseases of the musculoskeletal system, and symptoms, signs and ill defined conditions. 
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We estimate separate mortality hazard models for different causes of death. 
Causes of death we examine are broad categories for all acute diseases, and for all non-
acute diseases. We also estimate hazards for infectious and parasitic diseases only and 
diseases of the circulatory system10. We restrict the estimation sample to veterans with 
known cause of death. Estimation results are shown in Table 8. Column 1 shows the 
results for the risk of dying from all acute diseases. Observations for veterans who died 
for other reasons are right-censored at time of death. Otherwise, the estimation 
specification is as in the baseline hazard regression (Table 5, Column 1). The hazard ratio 
for dying of acute diseases is 0.83 for veterans who received a law of 1907 pension and 
0.69 for a law of 1912 pension. These findings indicate that pensions reduce the risk of 
dying from acute diseases, but the effect is statistically significant only for law of 1912 
pensions. The risk of dying from acute diseases is lower for literate veterans (hazard ratio 
= 0.689) and homeowners (hazard ratio = 0.749), and it is higher for artisans (hazard ratio 
= 1.583) and manual laborers (hazard ratio = 1.482). All other coefficients are not 
statistically significant. Column 2 shows estimation results for the risk of dying from 
infectious and parasitic diseases. The effect of pensions on the risk of dying from 
infectious and parasitic diseases is even stronger than for all acute diseases, with a hazard 
ratio of 0.611 for law of 1907 pensions, and 0.504 for law of 1912 pensions. These 
effects are statistically significant at the 5 percent level and one percent level, 
respectively. The shape parameter of 4.427 is noticeably lower than for all other 
specifications. For example, in the baseline specification (Table 5, Column 1) the shape 
parameter is 8.22. This indicates that the slope of the baseline hazard is less steep in age 
                                                 
10
 In results not shown, we also estimated hazard regressions fort the other death categories listed in table 8, 
but the results were often very imprecise due to small sample sizes. 
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for the risk of dying from infectious and parasitic diseases, than it is for other causes of 
death. Hazard regression results for the risk of dying from all non-acute diseases are 
shown in column 3. Hazard ratios are 0.909 for veterans who receive a law of 1907 and 
0.687 for law of 1912 pensions. Only the latter effect is statistically significant. 
Homeowners face a lower risk of dying from acute diseases (hazard ratio = 0.831) and 
married veterans are more likely to die from non-acute diseases (hazard ratio = 1.737). 
Column 4 shows estimation results for the risk of dying from diseases of the circulatory 
system. Veterans who receive a law of 1907 pension are less likely to die from 
circulatory diseases (hazard ratio = 0.892), but the effect is not statistically significant. 
The hazard ratio for veterans with a law of 1912 pension is 0.769 which is significantly 
lower than one at the 10 percent level. The risk of dying from circulatory diseases is also 
lower for homeowners (hazard ratio = 0.735), and it is higher for married veterans 
(hazard ratio = 1.444).   
In summary, we find that veteran pensions decrease mortality for a broad range of 
causes. These findings indicate that multiple pathways might play a role in explaining the 
effect of higher pensions on lower mortality. Our finding that pensions strongly reduce 
mortality from acute causes, especially from infectious diseases, is consistent with the 
hypothesis, advocated for example by McKeown (1976) and Fogel (2004), that better 
nutrition played an  important role in historic mortality declines. However, we find that 
pensions also reduced mortality from circulatory diseases and other non-acute conditions. 
Possible explanations for lower mortality from circulatory diseases and other chronic 
conditions include improved socioeconomic status, changes in health behaviors or 
retirement from hazardous work conditions. 
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8. Conclusions 
Changes in veteran pension laws provide us with a series of natural experiments, 
which allow estimating the causal effect of pensions on longevity. We study mortality 
patterns for Union Army veterans during the period from 1900 and 1917, and we 
examine the effects of the pension laws of 1907 and 1912, which introduced or 
substantially increased veteran pensions. Starting from 1907, every Union Army veteran 
with at least 90 days of service was entitled to a pension at age 62+. Using a Weibull 
hazard model, we find that veteran pensions decrease mortality considerably. Life-
expectancy increases by about 0.5 years and 2.7 years for veterans who receive a law of 
1907 pension and a law of 1912 pension, respectively. During our study period there was 
no increase in life expectancy for the overall elderly male population so that these effects 
can not be attributed to a time trend of increasing life expectancy. We find evidence for 
large causal effects from pensions to longevity across wealth groups and for both urban 
and rural populations, but the effects are largest for poorer veterans and for veterans who 
live outside big cities. Studying the effect of pensions on various causes of death allow us 
to draw inferences about the relative importance of alternative pathways in the income-
health relationship. Pensions reduced mortality for both acute and non-acute diseases, 
indicating that multiple pathways might be important. Pensions had the biggest effect on 
lower mortality from infectious diseases. This finding is consistent with the explanation 
that better nutrition was an important pathway for an effect from veteran pensions on 
health. But pensions also reduced mortality from circulatory diseases and other non-acute 
conditions. These findings could be explained by the effect of improved socioeconomic 
status, changes in health behaviors, or retirement from dangerous working conditions.  
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The main policy conclusion of our findings is that government transfers such as 
veteran pensions can not only improve the quality of life for beneficiaries, but can also 
substantially extend their length of life. The effects of veteran pensions on life 
expectancy were equivalent to the effect of many decades worth of medical progress and 
economic growth. This relationship was already suspected by contemporaries. In 1889, 
General M. Trumball speculated that “nothing increases longevity like a pension” (Logue 
and Blanck 2004). One important question is whether conditions during our study period 
can in any way be compared with contemporary conditions. In many ways, health 
conditions in early 20th century America were more similar to developing countries today 
than to developed countries. For example, factors such as poor nutrition, mortality from 
infectious diseases, and hazardous working and living conditions were common in the 
United States during our study period. Such factors are less important in the United States 
today, but they are still an urgent concern in many developing countries. However, health 
inequalities have not become smaller since the days of Union Army veterans (Cutler, 
Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006), and the health-income gradient is not confined to the 
desperately poor and undernourished (Marmot et al. 1991). Other pathways from higher 
income to lower mortality, such as reduced psychosocial stress, are still likely to be 
relevant in contemporary rich countries.  
Many important questions about the effect of pensions and other government 
transfers on the health of beneficiaries are still unresolved. One interesting question this 
study does not address is the relationship between the amount of pension and mortality. 
The amount of pension Union Army veterans receive depends on age and length of 
service, two factors that are not exogenous of health. Therefore we examine only the 
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effect of whether a veteran received a pension based on the laws of 1907 and 1912, but 
not the effect on mortality of how much pension veterans received. Also, if there is any 
substantial effect of government pensions on the health of beneficiaries, it is important to 
better understand the underlying pathways. The results of this study indicate that multiple 
pathways might be important. However, there are still many open questions about the 
relative importance of alternative explanations, which provide ample opportunities for 
future research. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Overview of Union Army Pension Laws 
 
Pension Law Who was eligible? Range of 
monthly 
pension 
Average 
monthly 
Pension1) 
General Law 
(since 1862) 
Veterans with war related disabilities $2 - $125 -2) 
Disability Act 
(since 1890) 
Veterans with disabilities, even if their 
origin was unrelated to war. The amount 
of pension depended on disability. 
$6 - $12 $9.45 
Act of 1907 
 
Any veteran who has served 90 days or 
more and is over age 62. The amount of 
pension depended on age. 
$12 - $20 $14.50 
Act of 1912 
(replaces act of 
1907) 
 
Any veteran who has served 90 days or 
more and is over age 62. The amount of 
pension depended on age and length of 
service. 
$13 - $30 $20.92 
1) For pension rulings in estimation sample in nominal U.S. dollars. For comparison: average monthly 
earnings for non-farm employees were $40.25 in 1900 (Lebergott 1984) 
2) Veterans who received general law pensions are not included in estimation sample 
 
 
 
Table 2: Take up and rejection rates (in %) 
 
 Law of 1907 1) Law of 1912 2) 
Take up rate     90.9    91.5 
Rejected at least once     5.8     3.4 
Rejected and never approved     0.6     0.4 
1) For sample of 6,087 veterans who survive beyond 1907 
2) For sample of 4,617 veterans who survive beyond 1912 
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Table 3: Sample statistics 
 
Variables+  Mean Standard Deviation 
Age in 1900 60.7 6.5 
Age at death 75.9 8.7 
Literate  0.938 0.433 
Married 0.817 0.474 
Occupation (professional 
or proprietor is omitted 
category) 
  
      Farmer 0.349 0.400 
Artisan 0.151 0.283 
Service 0.075 0.203 
Manual Labor 0.134 0.266 
Farmhand 0.038 0.149 
Unproductive 0.031 0.132 
Homeowner 0.676 0.498 
City pop > 250,000 in 1909 0.140 0.214 
Next 139 cities in 1909 0.105 0.187 
N 7931  
+
 Variables on being literate, marital status, occupation, homeowner status, and location are based on 
Census data for the year 1900. All shares are reported based on non-missing information for the respective 
variables. Information is missing for 20.2% of observations for being literate, 19.5% for marital status, 
42.7% for occupation, 31.6% for homeowner status, and 65.8% for location.  
 
 
 
Table 4: Population life expectancy for men by age and calendar year  
 
Calendar Year At Birth  Age 60 Age 65 
1900 46.41 14.18 11.35 
1907 48.29 13.69 11.01 
1912 52.34 14.34 11.49 
1917 52.18 14.11 11.22 
2000 74.03 19.55 15.91 
 
Source: Social Security Administration 2005, Table 10 in Actuarial Study No. 120 by F. Bell and M. Miller   
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Table 5: Mortality Hazard Regression, Period 1900 to 1917+ 
 Full Sample 
 
(1) 
Homeowner 
 
(2) 
Does not 
own home 
(3) 
Top 158 city 
in 1909 
(4) 
Smaller town 
or country 
(5) 
Received pension based on 
law of 1907 
0.918** 
(0.032) 
0.995 
(0.053) 
0.799** 
(0.063) 
0.915 
(0.112) 
0.765*** 
(0.056) 
Received pension based on 
law of 1912 
0.665*** 
(0.027) 
0.715*** 
(0.043) 
0.610*** 
(0.054) 
0.716** 
(0.099) 
0.589*** 
(0.048) 
Literate  0.993 
(0.069) 
0.874 
(0.088) 
1.063 
(0.130) 
1.824 
(0.665) 
1.052 
(0.149) 
Literate missing 1.015 
(0.160) 
0.935 
(0.333) 
1.313 
(0.491) 
1.547 
(0.780) 
1.000 
(0.347) 
Married 0.925 
(0.044) 
0.891 
(0.064) 
1.179 
(0.121) 
0.968 
(0.148) 
0.952 
(0.082) 
Marital status missing 1.023 
(0.150) 
1.080 
(0.559) 
1.728 
(1.251) 
0.542 
(0.390) 
- 
1)
 
Occupation (professional 
or proprietor is omitted 
category) 
     
Farmer 0.988 
(0.061) 
0.919 
(0.072) 
0.944 
(0.120) 
1.482 
(0.517) 
0.930 
(0.114) 
Artisan 1.103 
(0.074) 
1.022 
(0.097) 
1.193 
(0.135) 
1.046 
(0.155) 
1.113 
(0.113) 
Service 1.198 
(0.096) 
1.017 
(0.134) 
1.279 
(0.181) 
1.146 
(0.222) 
1.110 
(0.159) 
Manual Labor 1.079 
(0.077) 
0.957 
(0.104) 
1.103 
(0.129) 
0.912 
(0.174) 
1.137 
(0.123) 
Farmhand 
 
0.988 
(0.109) 
0.986 
(0.179) 
0.979 
(0.208) 
   - 
1)
 1.149 
(0.247) 
Unproductive 1.010 
(0.110) 
0.872 
(0.126) 
1.428 
(0.322) 
1.140 
(0.343) 
0.870 
(0.150) 
Occupation missing 1.002 
(0.057) 
0.839** 
(0.065) 
1.102 
(0.115) 
0.959 
(0.136) 
0.933 
(0.081) 
Homeowner 0.816*** 
(0.033) 
  0.729*** 
(0.084) 
0.837** 
(0.059) 
Homeowner status missing 0.911 
(0.054) 
  0.965 
(0.154) 
0.954 
(0.100) 
City pop > 250,000 in 1909 1.227*** 
(0.090) 
1.103 
(0.147) 
1.194 
(0.127) 
  
Next 139 cities in 1909 1.071 
(0.089) 
1.026 
(0.141) 
1.170 
(0.147) 
  
Location missing 1.010 
(0.040) 
0.996 
(0.053) 
1.070 
(0.082) 
  
Shape parameter (α) 
 
8.220*** 
(0.156) 
9.064*** 
(0.246) 
7.924*** 
(0.340) 
8.798*** 
(0.570) 
9.034*** 
(0.331) 
Variance of unobserved 
heterogeneity (σ) 
<0.0001 
(0.0002) 
<0.0001 
(<0.0001) 
<0.0001 
(0.0001) 
<0.0001 
(0.0002) 
<0.0001 
(0.0002) 
N 7,931 3,679 1,738 672 2,034 
+ Weibull hazard model, with gamma distributed heterogeneity term; Age is controlled for by initiating time 
at risk in the year of birth; time under observation starts in the year 1900. Whether veteran received a 
pension under law of 1907 (or 1912, respectively) is a time varying variable. All other covariates are fixed 
over time and are based on Census data for the year 1900. Estimation coefficients reflect hazard ratios; 
Standard errors in brackets.  
* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
1)
 Variable was omitted due to collinearity  
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Table 6: Life expectancy for Union Army veterans at age 65+ 
 
 Baseline Pension 
based on 
law of 1907 
Difference 
to baseline 
Pension 
based on 
law of 1912 
Difference 
to baseline 
Full sample 11.13 
(0.23) 
11.68 
(0.25) 
0.53 
(0.28) 
13.83 
(0.26) 
2.70 
(0.35) 
Homeowner 11.98 
(0.34) 
12.01 
(0.32) 
0.03 
(0.41) 
14.18 
(0.37) 
2.20 
(0.48) 
Does not own 
home 
10.05 
(0.57) 
11.49 
(0.63) 
1.44 
(0.66) 
13.31 
(0.63) 
3.26 
(0.77) 
Top 158 city in 
1909 
10.07 
(0.90) 
10.60 
(0.99) 
0.53 
(1.19) 
12.12 
(0.84) 
2.05 
(1.24) 
Smaller Town or 
country  
10.66 
(0.45) 
12.32 
(0.53) 
1.62 
(0.54) 
14.04 
(0.58) 
3.38 
(0.71) 
 
+Life expectancies are calculated based on hazard rates predicted from Weibull regression models in Table 
4. Standard errors in brackets are based on 200 bootstrap repetitions 
 
 
 
Table 7: Causes of death in sample (in %) 
 
Variable  Period  
1900 – 1917 
Proportion surviving  
   Entire Sample 
 
38.2 
Proportion of deceased  
   With cause of death 
 
47.8 
Cause of death (of all known causes)  
All acute 17.4 
   Infectious and parasitic diseases  6.9 
   Diseases of the respiratory system  9.9 
   Diarrhea 0.5 
Not acute 78.9 
   Diseases of the circulatory system 29.2 
   Cancer and Neoplasm 5.5 
   Diseases of the genitourinary system 7.9 
   Diseases of the digestive system 4.4 
   Other* 31.5 
Violence and accidents 3.7 
*Other causes included endocrine diseases, diseases of the blood and blood forming organs, diseases of the 
nervous system, diseases of the skin, diseases of the musculoskeletal system, and symptoms, signs, and ill 
defined conditions.  
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Table 8: Mortality hazard regression, by cause of death 
 All acute 
 
 
(1) 
Infectious 
and parasitic 
diseases 
(2) 
Not acute 
 
 
(3) 
Diseases of the 
circulatory 
system 
(4) 
Received pension based on 
law of 1907 
0.830 
(0.106) 
0.609** 
(0.131) 
0.909 
(0.055) 
0.892 
(0.102) 
Received pension based on 
law of 1912 
0.693** 
(0.099) 
0.519*** 
(0.129) 
0.687*** 
(0.052) 
0.760* 
(0.119) 
Literate  0.689* 
(0.145) 
1.074 
(0.426) 
1.132 
(0.140) 
1.327 
(0.313) 
Literate missing 0.847 
(0.479) 
1.3256 
(1.262) 
1.011 
(0.284) 
1.444 
(0.739) 
Married 0.809 
(0.155) 
1.002 
(0.338) 
1.737*** 
(0.193) 
1.444* 
(0.276) 
Marital status missing 0.981 
(0.542) 
1.449 
(1.335) 
1.685* 
(0.458) 
1.340 
(0.639) 
Occupation (professional 
or proprietor is omitted 
category) 
    
Farmer 0.979 
(0.225) 
0.994 
(0.355) 
0.969 
(0.097) 
0.918 
(0.165) 
Artisan 1.583** 
(0.346) 
1.543 
(0.542) 
1.090 
(0.114) 
1.267 
(0.230) 
Service 1.304 
(0.361) 
1.907 
(0.759) 
0.966 
(0.129) 
1.158 
(0.261) 
Manual Labor 1.482* 
(0.341) 
1.516 
(0.562) 
0.927 
(0.106) 
1.113 
(0.216) 
Farmhand 
 
1.100 
(0.419) 
2.213 
(1.065) 
1.194 
(0.202) 
1.583* 
(0.441) 
Unproductive 1.359 
(0.565) 
2.444 
(1.395) 
0.852 
(0.175) 
0.911 
(0.341) 
Occupation missing 1.174 
(0.237) 
1.210 
(0.392) 
0.978 
(0.088) 
0.865 
(0.142) 
Homeowner 0.749** 
(0.099) 
0.765 
(0.154) 
0.831*** 
(0.054) 
0.735** 
(0.090) 
Homeownership missing 0.707 
(0.150) 
0.476* 
(0.181) 
1.000 
(0.102) 
0.894 
(0.161) 
City pop > 250,000 in 
1909 
1.420* 
(0.299) 
1.245 
(0.435) 
1.076 
(0.120) 
0.983 
(0.199) 
Next 139 cities in 1909 0.726 
(0.222) 
0.819 
(0.388) 
0.920 
(0.122) 
0.893 
(0.210) 
Location missing 0.945 
(0.129) 
1.176 
(0.255) 
0.896 
(0.058) 
0.952 
(0.110) 
Shape parameter (α) 
 
6.500*** 
(0.555) 
4.427*** 
(0.890) 
9.044*** 
(0.481) 
9.084*** 
(1.071) 
Variance of unobserved 
heterogeneity (σ) 
<0.0001 
(0.0014) 
<0.0001 
(0.016) 
0.012 
(0.079) 
0.417 
(0.592) 
N 3,865 3,865 3,865 3,865 
+ Weibull hazard model, with gamma distributed heterogeneity term; Age is controlled for by initiating time 
at risk in the year of birth; time under observation starts in the year 1900. Veterans who died because of 
other causes are treated as censored. Whether veteran received a pension under law of 1907 (or 1912, 
respectively) is a time varying variable. All other covariates are fixed over time and refer to information in 
the year 1900. Estimation coefficients reflect hazard ratios; Standard errors in brackets. 
* Significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level 
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Figure 1: Illustration of the identification strategy (i.e. for mortality at age 65)   
 
 
 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Time 
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Union Army Veterans 
General Population 
     a        Effect of law of 1907 pensions 
     b        Effect of law of 1912 pensions 
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